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ABSTRACT
Harmonization of accounting rules around the world has been a goal
of many international accounting groups. Often the term harmonization
is used to mean uniform measurement and disclosure rules. In this paper,
information content, rather than the numbers, of the financial statements
is chosen as the object of study. Prediction of corporate failures using
financial information in Korea and the U.S. is used as an example of
international use of accounting information. It was found that due to
reliability of Korean data, differences in accounting rules and economic
structure, the use of Korean accounting data should include appropriate
adjustments
.

Using Foreign Financial Statements for Risk Analysis
An Empirical Test
Introduction
Comparability of accounting data between countries has become a
subject of interest due to the rapid increase in joint projects between
the companies in different countries and the efforts of foreign cor-
porations to raise capital in the U.S. capital markets.
Nair [1982] grouped countries based on accounting measurement rules
and on disclosure requirements. He asserted that comparisons of finan-
cial statements from countries in different groups should not be made.
Choi et. -al., [1983] conducted a study comparing the properties of
financial ratios of companies in Japan and Korea to those of comparable
American corporations. They found significant differences between the
countries in the financial ratio measures. They attributed the dif-
ferences to accounting practices as well as to the different economic
climates and social structures. In both studies the authors concen-
trated on the data reported in the financial statements, rather than on
the information contained in the statements. It is not very surprising
to find differences between the financial statements of companies
operating under different socio-economic environments, prepared under
different measurement rules and disclosure requirements. Now that we
know the numbers are different, the remaining, and perhaps the real,
question is whether the financial statements contain the same types of
information on financial position and profitability of operations. If
they do, then we can ask, "Do specific ratios and line items represent
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Lhe same characLeristics as they do in the United States?" A more fun-
damental question is "Can we use the knowledge gained through empirical
research in financial statement analyses in the United States to analyze
financial statements from foreign countries?"
The purpose of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence in
the use of accounting data for risk analysis in Korea and compare the
results to the findings in the U.S. Assessment of default risk on
loans to corporations before and after the loan decisions are made
is a common practice. For non-banking users of the statements, the
default risk information can be useful for evaluating potential part-
ners in joint ventures or in licensing agreements in* Korea. In any
event, use of financial accounting data for prediction of corporate
failure is assumed to be an important example.
The empirical study performed with Korean data is presented in
the next section. The findings are compared to those of U.S. studies.
Finally, implications of the findings for use of foreign (Korean)
financial statements are drawn.
The Korean Study
During the past two decades, Korea experienced a steady and rapid
economic growth under the control of government economic planners and
policymakers. Although the actors were private enterprises, the wri-
ters and the stage managers were government officials. The role of
commercial banks was to act merely as windows to dispense funds, after
allocation decisions had been made by the government. The emphasis on
export markets, international competitiveness, and on controllability
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of the economy naturally lead to resource allocation decisions
favorable toward a few very large companies. Therefore, the decisions
on large loans to the major corporations were based more on political
and policy goals rather than based on financial information and risk of
default. The role of accounting information to aid in efficient allo-
cation of resources in the market place was largely ignored as being
purely academic with little practical substance. The banks themselves
had no real authority nor responsibility for making major loan deci-
sions. Loans to smaller companies were not available as a general rule
unless they were well secured by some collateral.
During the past two years, the government has taken steps to
liberalize the banking practices. The government went as far as to
sell virtually all of its holdings in the commercial banks. Not
completely independent of these activities, the major banks started to
explore ways to evaluate credit worthiness of their corporate customers
[Korea Development Bank 1982] . Their study was exclusively on very
large companies whose success and failure depended to some extent on
direct political decisions of the government rather than solely on
financial factors or general economic conditions. Nevertheless, the
banks felt that they will be held responsible for bad debt losses in
the future. They started to seek ways to improve their loan granting
decisions
.
This study is based on the experience of small companies which,
individually, would not have sufficient political power to engineer
favorable intervention by the government. Specifically, the data are
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obtained from the Korea Loan Guaranty Fund, Korea's Small Business
Administration loan program. In 1976, the government established a
fund, Korea Loan Guaranty Fund (Fund), to help small businesses in
their effort to obtain bank, loans, at an interest rate up to 20 percent
per annum lower than the curb-market rates (14% to 35% annual interest
rate). The Fund does not make loans directly to businesses but guaran-
tees the repayment of loans made by commercial banks, for a nominal fee
of one percent of the loan amount per annum.
The Fund is different from commercial banks in three aspects.
First, the Fund guarantees only loans to companies whose ability to
put up collaterals to obtain secured loans have been exhausted. Thus,
the Fund's guaranty must be based on an assessment of the company's
future cash generation ability through profitable operations. Second,
most of the companies are small businesses run by the owners, rather
than by professional managers. The smallness of the companies reduces
the possibility of external forces influencing the loan decisions and
future outcomes. Also, the accounting information of the small com-
panies tend to be less reliable than reports of the large companies
whose financial statements are examined by independent auditors.
Third, the objective of the Fund is not solely to minimize the losses
due to defaulted loans. Afterall, the Fund's very existence is to make
funds available to the companies whose ability to raise funds through
regular channels have been already exhausted. The Fund must balance
the need to support the promising companies in need of funds against
putting good money after the bad. In other words, the Fund must be
able to encourage the economy while minimizing the cost (of bad loans).
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By the end of 1981, the outstanding balance of the guaranteed loans
stood at approximately two billion U.S. dollars, spread over 18,640
companies. The annual amount of losses to the Fund due to defaulted
loans reached 150 million dollars. The default rate has been increasing
since 1980, and has been rising steadily.
This trend was a cause for alarm among managers of the Fund as well
as among government officials, since the government has final respon-
sibility for resource requirements of the Fund. Therefore, a study was
performed to help improve the loan guaranty decisions. That study is
the basis for the analysis of information content of financial ratios
in Korea, reported in this paper [Park and Jee 1982]
.
Sample and Data
Initially a random sample of 150 problem cases from the past three
years were selected. Two hundred fifty-eight normal cases were
selected at random from the active file to serve as the control group.
Request for data were made to the field offices by the home office.
Non-response and the insufficient data reduced the usable cases to 42
problem cases and 154 normal cases. Several cross tabulations were
made to test for sample representativeness and no profound differences
between the sample and the population were found except for the large
proportion of problem cases in the sample which is due to the stra-
tified sampling procedure. Each of the problem cases were matched in
the control group based on the industry (see Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
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Financial records and other credit evaluation information on the
companies were collected for three years, 1979-1981. As noted earlier
the subject companies were small businesses and the reliability of their
accounting records were questionable. Therefore, the information was
2
obtained from their tax returns. While the tax return information
may be biased, it was assumed that the information tends to understate
3
assets and income, rather than overstate , thus giving a more con-
servative picture of the company's credit worthiness.
This study suffers from the following inherent shortcomings of
the sample and data. The sample was selected from the population of
companies who were granted credits initially. The population did not
include the companies whose application for a guaranty was denied.
Thus, the sample selected can provide information only for type II
errors (erroneous decision to guaranty) but not for type I errors
4(erroneous decision to deny). Another limitation is that the quality
of accounting data fall short of that of large corporations or of U.S.
corporations. However, it is the best available data and the real
decision makers at the Fund must use this data for the actual loan
guaranty decisions. These problems not withstanding the analysis of
the data were performed assuming reliability of the data.
Analysis of Data
Initially financial ratios identified as being important by
previous studies were computed for each of the 84 cases for two years.
Indicator variable (y) was used to classify the cases into normal
(0) and problem (1) cases. A stepwise regression was made with
this indicator variable as the dependent measure, and the financial
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exercise in futility. Second, it could be such that the management
became aware of worsening financial conditions and the need for addi-
tional loans. Management then adopted certain accounting principles to
make the financial conditions look healthier. Third, the management
may have taken certain steps, other than accounting, to temporarily
make the financial statements look better. If the second and/or third
reason were valid, the credit analysts should take care to utilize data
that are somewhat immune to management manipulations. Therefore a
regression run was made with additional non-financial variables in the
2
equation. The result was somewhat better, (R - .395) with market
share,, industry competitiveness, and capacity utilization rate being
included as significant variables. The classification was 80 percent
i
8
correct in the sample.
Finally, based on the results of the regression runs significant
financial and other variables were selected. Then, two discriminant
functions were developed; one with financial ratios only and another
with other information included. The results of the discriminant ana-
lyses are quite similar to those of the regression runs.
Insert Table 3 about here
The variables found to be most significant were market share and
sales growth rate data among the non-financial ratio data and current
asset/sales, net working capital/total assets and quick assets/sales
among the financial ratios. Therefore, the direct indicator of default
in Korean small business were determined to be the inability to meet
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short term financial needs rather than long term profitability or
c u 9soundness ot the operations.
In order to examine the validity of this finding, another study was
examined. The author is not aware of any other study that dealt with
small businesses in Korea. Only one among several studies that dealt
with large companies has been made public [Korea Development Bank,
1982]. The study was based on 24 failed firms and 24 healthy firms
matched on industry, sales and total asset size. Discriminant func-
tions were developed based on 21 financial ratios.
The discriminatory power of the models were 68.75 percent for
three years ahead, 85.42 percent two years ahead and 93.75 percent for
one year ahead predictions of the failures. The key variables for each
of the three models are presented in Table 4 below.
Insert Table 4 about here
Concentrating on the two years ahead model, we can compare the
results of the KDB study with ours. The non-financial data were not
included in the KDB study, therefore only the financial ratios can be
compared. Among the key variables in the KDB study we find the
income/total assets and the rate of increase in profit. The major
difference is that while our study picked mostly balance sheet based
information, KDB study picked all but one income statement based
ratios. The result could be in the design of the study, initial selec-
tion of variables, or in the nature of the sample firms, small vs.
large. It also could be due to the differences in quality of data.
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Since the information for the large companies were audited by indepen-
dent auditors, they should be more reliable than those of the small
companies. This may explain the large difference in the classif icaiton
ability between the two and one year before models. The fact that
balance sheet data are easier to verify than the flow data in the
income statement may have contributed to the small business study
selecting the balance sheet ratios. In any event, if the tax return
information were the best financial information available for small
companies at reasonable cost we should develop means to use the infor-
mation. Next, we briefly compare the above two studies with those of
the U.S. based studies.
Comparison with the U.S. Findings
The purpose of this section is to present a highly condensed sum-
mary of the results of U.S. based studies, and to compare the findings
with those of the Korean studies.
The credit evaluation studies in the U.S. can be classified into
(1) prediction of failure and (2) bond rating studies. Prediction of
failure studies aim to provide some sort of a scoring model which will
classify the firms into either the survival class or the failure class
and the goodness of the model is determined by the accuracy of the
classification and how far in advance the classification can be made.
The bond rating studies try to determine the ratings that will be
provided by the bond rating agencies. The major difference between the
two types of studies is that the failure studies are trying to predict
a state of nature while the rating studies are trying to model the
decisions made by experts which may or may not be entirely correct.
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Table 5 presents the variables most commonly cited as being signifi-
cant in various studies.
Insert Table 5 about here
Most of the published studies in the U.S. are based on large com-
panies. Since we found differences between the large and small com-
panies, it was important to determine whether the differences are due
to the design differences of the study (study specific), unique to
Korea (country specific), or due to differences in size (general).
Unpublished study on small business failures by Alvez [1978] was exa-
mined to compare with the studies based on large companies.
Understandably, the bond rating studies tend to emphasize the
ratios related to debt coverage and interest payments while the
failure studies concern themselves more with the profitability of the
firms. The results of the failure studies are more directly applicable
to our study.
Comparing the results with that of the Korean studies we find that
the variables picked in the U.S. studies and the KDB studies were
rather different. For the failure studies only the Net income/Total
assets is the common ratio picked by both. Interest coverage ratio
picked in bond rating studies were also picked in the KDB study.
Comparing with the Korean small business study, we find current assets
to sales and quick assets to sales data as the common ratios. Casual
observation of the Table 5 does not reveal any glaring differences
between the Korean and U.S. small businesses or between small and large
businesses in the U.S. A plausible inference is that the Korean large
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businesses operate in a different political/economic environment from
others, at least in obtaining funds. This type of comparison, however,
is too subjective and study specific to be acceptable as evidence. In
order to provide more objective evidence, replications of studies using
the Korean data were conducted.
Replications
In order to evaluate the compatibility between the U.S. and Korean
financial statements and between the small and large companies, the
default prediction models developed in other studies were applied to
the Korean small business data. Since we were interested in the infor-
mation content of the financial data rather than the direct applica-
bility of the models, the variables identified in various studies were
used as discriminant factors and the factor coefficients were recalcu-
lated based on the Korean data. Replications were repeated to deter-
mine the stability of the findings. The accuracy of two year ahead
predictions of various sets is presented in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
The results indicate that the predictive accuracy varies somewhat
from sample to sample. We find the variables from U.S. studies per-
formed slightly better than the KDB studies. This is somewhat surprising
since the differences were expected to stem from the different economic
structure and accounting practices. The large size effect, difference
between Korean large and small companies, may indicate the impact of
government intervention in financing activities of large companies in
Korea.
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The result indicates that there exist some differences between the
Korean small businesses and other groups. The variables selected for
discriminant models and their significance is not consistent across the
board. Availability and quality of data somewhat limits the generaliza-
bility of the results, but we wish to argue that sufficient evidence
has been provided to call attention to the fact that the information
content and comparability in decision setting is the real issue rather
than harmonization of the financial statement numbers.
Comparability of the Financial Statement Information
In this paper we tried to evaluate the information content of the
financial statement data between U.S. and Korea. It was known already
that the two countries have different accounting disclosure standards
and measurement rules, and that equity structure and other financing
strategies are somewhat different. The specific aim of this study was
to see whether the financial statements of Korean firms can be eval-
uated in a manner similar to that of U.S. firms. This question would
remain even if the statements of a Korean company were adjusted to meet
the U.S. GAAP, since the underlying economic factors are not likely to
be similar to the conditions in the U.S. Therefore, the question is an
empirical one and has significance for evaluating potential partners in
Korea.
The result of this study indicates that the quality of the
accounting information varies greatly by the size of the companies in
Korea. Relatively short history of public markets for capital and tax
oriented accounting practices may have contributed to poor financial
accounting information for non-public companies.
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As for Uhe decision at hand of evaluating a potential partner,
especially a small business, some adjustments need to be made. The
companies' market position within the Korean market (i.e., market
share) should be evaluated. Since Korea is a relatively small market,
compared to that of U.S., a number of strong competitors in the market
place can make the investment in the smaller companies a risky one.
However, if the U.S. company is willing to support the Korean com-
panies short-term financial needs as well, a substantial portion of
the risk can be eliminated. Heavier emphasis should be placed on the
financial data pertaining to and prepared before the negotiations began.
There exist some circumstantial evidence that firms can take actions
so as to temporarily make the financial ratios favorable without
improving the real conditions at all. This can be accomplished
through (cosmetic) accounting changes and/or off statement financing
activities in addition to outright falsifications. Therefore, more
reliance should be put on the data that are not likely to have been
manipulated and can be verified by direct observations. The tax return
information before the talks began is less likely to have been subject
to manipulation. Balance sheet data can be verified by independent
auditors through physical inspection and confirmation with the external
data sources such as banks and customers.
Returning to the original purpose of this paper, we conclude that
the use of Korean accounting data should include appropriate adjustments
for differences in accounting and economic structures. Reliability of
accounting data cannot be taken for granted in using Korean data, in
addition to the measurement and disclosure differences. Not only the
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debt-equity structure of the U.S. and Korean companies different, the
key factors for survival seems to be some what different. In Korea,
the short-terra liquidity seems to be a very important characteristics
of a healthy company.
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Notes
Unusually large number of the problem cases were processed based
on recommendations of governmental units. Governmental decision to
support a particular industry would preempt any decision by the Fund.
Accordingly, the records of those cases did not include sufficient
financial data for analysis. Exclusion of these cases does not limit
the scope of the study since the case are out of the Fund's jurisdiction
in reality.
2
The Fund itself uses the tax return information. In many cases
the companies did not have adequate enough accounting system to
produce even the basic financial statements.
3
There were isolated cases where the company reported higher
income and paid additional taxes to obtain the benefits of the Fund's
guaranty and the lower interest rate. However, it was not a prevalent
phenomena and the overall validity of the data was assumed to be unaf-
fected by those cases.
4
This limitation is not unique to this study. Any study of loan
portfolio would contain this limitation, see Dietrich and Kaplan
[1981] for example.
While the poor quality of data does not affect the validity of
the study as to the loan guaranty decisions, it does diminish the com-
parative analyses of financial ratios between the countries.
6
This finding, however, could be due to the fact the firms in the
population all had large debts, at least more than they can put up
collaterals and obtain secured loans. Therefore, this finding may
simply suggest that when all the firms are highly debt financed, their
short-term surival ability is important in assessing the long-term
profitability.
While it is very important to determine the cause of this phenomenon,
it is a major project by itself. In this study the possiblity of
complete data inadequacy is assumed away.
8 .
When the changes in the financial ratios were included (in effect
two years of ratio data), the R^ improved to .418 and the classifi-
cation accuracy increased to 83.2 percent. However, the differences
were considered insignificant.
9
An example would be where a sound small business sub-contract
with a large corporation and finances the production with short-term
loans, possibly at a very high curb market rate, and experiences a
long delay of several months in collection of the receivable from the
large corporation. Consequently, the small business would default on
the loan it used to finance the production.
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Since the experimental and control firms were matched on
industry and sales, the market share data would have been a controlled
variable.
The Korean studies are of the failure prection type. A study of
rating type could not be performed since the data were not available
for those firms whose applications for loan guaranty were declined.
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Table 1: Industry Distribution of Sample Firms
Group Default Normal
(Experiment) (Control)
Industry
Manufacturing 32 32
Construction 4 4
Retailing 3 3
Trucking 2 2
Others 1 1
Total 42 42
Table 2: Multiple Regression Using Financial Ratios
Step Variables b R2 R2 r
1 Current Assets/Total Assets .1289 .052 .052 .2289
2 Net Working Capital/Sales -.6078 .124 .071 -.1203
3 Quick Assets/Current Liabilities .3179 .184 .064 .1223
4 Accounts Receivable/Sales -.3708 .260 .076 -.1201
5 Current Assets/Sales .5465 .274 .014 -.0245
6 Quick Assets/Sales -.4147 .294 .020 -.0653
7 Quick Assets/Total Assets .5025 .302 .008 .2141
8 Current Assets/Current Liabilities -.1212 .210 .008 .1038
9 Cash/Sales -.2037 .313 .003 -.1581
10 Net Working Capital/Current Liab. .4253 .316 .003 -.0122
11 Cash/Total Assets -.2449 .322 .006 .0314
12 Net Income/Total Assets -.1452 .326 .004 -.0024
13 Total Debt/Total Assets -.0905 .330 .004 -.0807
14 Net Working Capital/Total Assets .0782 .331 .001 .1165
15 Cash Flow/Total Debt
Constant
.0409
.2758
.331 .000 .0009
Table 3: Summary of Regression and MDA Analyses
Data
Regression MDA
Actual Prediction Actual Prediction
Good Bad Good Bad
Good 26 16 Good 29 13
1 Year
Financial Bad 10 32 Bad 12 30
Total (69.05%) (70.24%)
Good 31 11 Good 33 9
2 years
Financial Bad 10 32 Bad 14 28
Total (75%) (72.62%)
Good 32 10 Good 34 8
1 year
Financial & Bad 7 35 Bad 7 35
Others
Total (79.76%) (82.14%)
Key Variables Selected
Financial: Current Assets/Sales
Net Working Capital/Total Assets
Cash/Total Assets
Quick Assets/Sales
Non-financial: Market Share
Sales Growth
Years in Business
Table 4: Discriminant Analysis by Korea Development Bank
Years Prior
to Failure
Variables Actual Prediction
3 Years 11,8,7,5
Good Bad
Good 18 6
Bad 9 15
Total (68.75%)
2 Years 5,4,6,3,1,2,7,8,12
Good Bad
Good 21 3
Bad 4 30
Total (85.42%)
1 Year 2,9,10,7,6,1,12
Good Bad
Good 24
Bad 3 21
Total (93.75%)
Variables
:
1 Owner's Equity/Total Assets
2 Total Assets/Total Debt
3 Net Income/Sales
4 Gross Profit/Sales
5 Operating Income/Total Assets
6 Ordinary Income/Sales
7 Total Revenue/Total Expenses
8 Total Debt/ Interest Expense
9 Sales/Total Assets
10 Sales/Fixed Assets
11 Sales/Inventory
12 Increase in Ordinary Income/Ordinary income ,
Table 5: Comparison of Significant Variables by Company Size and Country
SMALL
LARGE
KOREAN U.S.
Current Assets/Sales ALVEZ: NET PROFIT ON SALES
Net Working Capital/Total Assets NET PROFIT ON NETWORTH
Cash/Total Assets CURD/NETWORTH
Quick Assets/Sales CURD/INVEN
CURRATIO
Market Share QUICK RATIO
Sales Growth Rate EBT/NETWORTH
Years in Business EBT/TOTA
Product line Experience
Diversification
,
KOREAN DEV'T BANK DEAKIN: CURA/TOTA
TOTD/TOTA
2 yrs- OPERATING INCOME/TOTA CURA/SALES
GROSS PROFIT/SALES WORKING CAP/SALES
ORDINARY INC/SALES
NETINC/SALES
OWNER'S EQUITY /TOT. ASSET
TOTA/TOTD
TOTR/TOTEXP
INC. IN ORDINARY INCOME /ORD. INCOME
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